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Abstract
In [2, 17, 4] it has been shown that quantum resources can allow us to achieve a family of equilibria that can
have sometimes a better social welfare, while guaranteeing privacy. We use graph games to propose a way to build
non-cooperative games from graph states, and we show how to achieve an unlimited improvement with quantum
advice compared to classical advice.
1 Introduction
An important tool in analysing games is the concept of Nash equilibrium [16], which represents situations where
no player has incentive to deviate from their strategy. This corresponds to situations observed in real life, with
applications in economics, sociology, international relations, biology, etc. All equilibria do not have the same social
welfare, i.e. the average payoff is different from one equilibrium to another. Games of incomplete information can
exhibit better equilibria if players use a resource – a general correlation, Q. Such correlation can be viewed as a
resource produced by a mediator to give advice to the players. The concept of advice generalizes the notion of Nash
equilibrium to a broader class of equilibria [3]. All such equilibria can be classified according to the properties of the
resource correlation. Three classes can be identified in addition to Nash equilibria (no correlation), namely general
communication equilibria (Comm) [8], where Q is unrestricted, belief-invariant equilibria (BI) [9, 10, 13, 14] and
correlated equilibria (Corr) [3]. The canonical versions of these equilibria form a sequence of nested sets within
the set of canonical correlations:
Nash ⊂ Corr ⊂ BI ⊂ Comm.
It was demonstrated that there exist games where BI equilibria can outperform Corr equilibria [17] (in terms of
a social welfare (SW) of a game) as well as games where BI equilibria outperform any non-BI equilibria.
Winter at al. [2] introduce quantum correlated equilibria as a subclass of BI equilibria and show that quantum
correlations can achieve optimal SW. This provides the link with quantum nonlocality, where quantum resources
are used to produce non-signalling correlations. In this context, belief invariance describes the largest class of
correlations that obey relativistic causality.
A characteristic feature of belief-invariance is that it ensures privacy – the other players involved in the game
have no infomation about the input one player sent to the resource.
To obtain the canonical form of the games, [15] show that one can suppose that the output of the correlation
resource is the answer the players give by delegating the extra computation (from game question to input to
the box and from output of the box to players’ answer) to the mediator. Therefore, quantum equilibria can be
reached in a setting where players each measure quantum systems or, equivalently, by just having a central system
providing advices by measuring a quantum device.
Ref. [2] highlights several open questions. In particular,
(1) Whether any full-coordination game (a.k.a. a non-local game in quantum physics and computer science
communities) can be converted into a conflict-of-interests game. Ref. [17] gives an example of a two-player
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variant of the CHSH game, while [2] extends their result to an n-player game in which there exists a BI
equilibrium which is better than any Corr equilibrium.
(2) How can we get a large separation between the expected payoff for the quantum and correlated equilibrium
cases, and what is the upper bound for the separation? In the case of two-player full coordination games
this question was settled in [6, 12]. Are there conflict-of-interest games which exhibit large separation?
In this paper, we provide a natural way to convert graph games (and more generally stabiliser games) into
conflict-of-interest games, and we show how we can create unbounded separation by increasing the number of
players or using penalty techniques (a negative payoff).
An interesting feature in these games compared to the usual pseudo-telepathy scenarios studied in quantum
information is the notion of involvement [1, 15], which allows one to define some interesting scenarios in non-
cooperative games and which exhibits novel features, e.g. unlimited separation. If a player participates in the
game but is not involved (on a particular round) it means that their strategy is not taken into account when
determining the win/lose outcome. However, they do receive a corresponding payoff.
Using these games one can build games with bounded personal utilities v0, v1 on O(log(
1

)) players ensuring
CSW (G)
QSW (G
≤ , where CSW/QSW are the Classical/Quantum Social Welfares, respectively.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we describe graph games which are the underlying non-local games
used to define our games. In Sec. 3 we define a non-collaborative game as a modification of the collaborative games
by introducing unequal payoffs corresponding to answers 0 and 1 of each player, and discuss the corresponding
quantum perfect strategy. We consider a particular version of graph games from the cycle on five vertices. Sec.
4 discusses variations of non-collaborative games based on the cycle on five vertices. Finally, Sec. 5 shows how
one can amplify the quantum advantage by adding a penalty for wrong answers and by increasing the number of
players.
2 Graph games
Non-local games play a key role in Quantum Information theory. They can be viewed as a setting in which
players that are not allowed to communicate receive some inputs and have to produce some outputs, and there
is a winning/losing condition depending globally on their outputs for each input. Particular types of games are
pseudo-telepathy games [5] which are games that can be won perfectly using quantum resources but that are
impossible to win perfectly without communication when the players have access only to shared randomness.
Multipartite collaborative games (MCG(G)) are a family of pseudo-telepathy games based on certain types of
quantum states called graph states. The players are identified with vertices of the graph and have a binary
input/output each with the winning/losing conditions built using the stabilisers of the graph states.
The combinatorial game1 MCG with n players consists in asking the players questions: for each question q,
each player i receives one bit qi as input and answers one bit ai. They can either all win or all lose depending on
their answer, with winning/losing conditions described by a set {(q, I(q), b(q))} where
• q ∈ {0, 1}n is a valid question in which each player i gets the bit qi and in the subgraph of the vertices
corresponding to players receiving one, all vertices have even degree. Let I1 = {i, qi = 1} and G′ = G|I1 , a
question is valid if each vertex of G′ has an even number of neighbors in G′
• I(q) ⊂ [n] is a subset of players that are called ‘involved’ in the question as the sum (modulo 2) of their
answers determines the winning/losing condition according to the bit b(q):
• b(q) is defined such that the players win the game when the question is q if the sum of the answers of the
involved players is equal to the parity of the number of edges of the subgraph of the vertices corresponding
to players receiving one:
∑
i∈I(q) ai = b(q) = |E(G′)| mod 2.
For instance the game associated to the cycle on 5 elements MCG(C5) is defined by
• When the question is q = 11111 (each player has input 1), the players lose if the binary sum of their answer
is 0, i.e.
∑4
i=0 ai = 0 mod 2 , and win otherwise.
• When the question contains 010 for three players corresponding to three adjacent vertices, the players lose
if the binary sum of the answer of these three players is 1 i.e. ai−1 + ai + ai+1 = 0 mod 2 when q contains
0i−11i0i+1.
• The players win otherwise.
1without considering probability distributions
2
A variation of this game can be done by reducing the set of valid questions, for instance in the above set-up
the questions of the second type have only three players “involved”, so a first version could be to chose only 5
questions of the second type and give always 0 as advice to the non-involved players. This is the game studied as
an example in [15].
An important point is that the notion of involvement in MCG games is absent in unique games and introduces
situations where the players might change their strategy (answer) without changing the winning/losing status of
the global strategy.
To analyse these games and the strategies, one can imagine a scenario where there is one special player
representing Nature who is playing against the other players. The strategy of Nature is therefore a probability
distribution over the questions that we study here (as is standard in game theory) as a known function on the
set of questions w : T → [0, 1] such that ∑t∈T w(t) = 1. The games will be therefore defined by equipping the
combinatorial game with a probability distribution over the questions.
3 Defining non-collaborative games
Like in multipartite collaborative graph games MCG(G), we associate a non-collaborative game NC(G) to each
graph. We differentiate the payoff of the players using the value of their output: If the global answer wins in the
non-local game, each player gets v1 if they answer 1 and v0 if they answer 0. If the global answer loses, they get
0.
To match the traditional terminology used in game theory the output from now on will be called strategy,
and the input called type. The payoff is called utility and the social welfare is the average of the utilities over the
players.
A non-collaborative game NC(G) is thus defined from MCG(G) as follows
• The considered types are T ⊂ {0, 1}n where n is the number of vertices of G.
• As in MCG, to each type t ∈ T corresponds an associated involved set I(t) of players, and an expected
binary answer b(t).
• As in MCG, the losing set is
L = {(s, t),
∑
i∈I(t)
si 6= b(t) mod 2}.
We say that the players using a strategy s, given a type t, collectively win the game when the sum of the
local strategies of the involved players is equal to the requested binary answer modulo 2.
• the payoff function is:
uj(s|t) =
{
vsj if (s, t) 6∈ L
0 Otherwise
Firstly we consider the cycle on five vertices C5. We define NC00(C5) based on the non-local game MCG(C5)
studied in [1, 15] For questions which involve three players, both non-involved players have type 0 (see Figure 1).
Type Involved set Binary answer
Ta = 11111 I(Ta) = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} b(T0) = 1
T0 = 10000 I(T0) = {0, 1, 4} b(T0) = 0
T1 = 01000 I(T1) = {0, 1, 2} b(T1) = 0
T2 = 00100 I(T2) = {1, 2, 3} b(T2) = 0
T3 = 00010 I(T3) = {2, 3, 4} b(T3) = 0
T4 = 00001 I(T4) = {3, 4, 0} b(T4) = 0
Table 1: NC00(G) game.
We consider the game with the type probability distribution w(t) = 1/6 for all the types.
The quantum perfect strategy for NC(G) is obtained when the players each have a qubit from graph state |G〉
[1]. Each player i measures their qubit according to their type ti, getting a quantum advice representing their
part of the quantum strategy si.[1] From the study of MCG(G) we have
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(a) Ta = 11111,
I = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, b = 1
(b) T0 = 10000,
I = {4, 0, 1}, b = 0
(c) T1 = 01000,
I = {0, 1, 2}, b = 0
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(d) T2 = 00100,
I = {1, 2, 3}, b = 0
(e) T3 = 00010,
I = {2, 3, 4}, b = 0
(f) T4 = 00001,
I = {3, 4, 0}, b = 0
Figure 1: NC00(C5): Square nodes indicate a 1 in the associated type, while
circular nodes indicate a 0. Involved players in each case are shaded in red.
Theorem 1. If all the players collaborate (follow the quantum advice) then for any probability distribution over
the types, the utility of each player is (v0 + v1)/2.
Proof. The output of each quantum measurement provides uniformly all the possible answers.
3.1 Is the quantum pseudo-telepathy solution a Nash equilibrium?
As the players now have an incentive to answer 1, they can sacrifice always getting a good answer to maximize their
utility. Indeed, in the previous game, each player is always involved when they get type 1 and with probability
1/2 when they get type 0; getting the wrong answer in that case only costs v0.
Without loss of generality we consider v1 ≥ v0. The players now have an incentive to answer 1, because they
might be able to maximize their utility by allowing the non-zero probability of a wrong answer. Indeed, in the
previous game, NC00(C5), if the player gets type 1 then they are certain that they are involved, and they won’t
gain by defecting (not following advice). However, if their type is 0, then the probability of them being involved is
1/2, and so there is a fifty percent chance that they will benefit from always answering 1 while not compromizing
the winning combination. Getting the wrong answer in that case only costs v0.
Theorem 2. Let p
(i)
inv(ti, si) be the probability for the player i who gets type ti and advice si to be involved
Then, in NC(G), the quantum advice gives a belief-invariant Nash equilibrium iff
v0
v1
≥ (1− p),
where
p = min
i
min
ti
p
(i)
inv(ti, 0).
Proof. If the advice is si = 1 then the winning payoff is already v1. Consider the case when player i is given the
advice si = 0 (which would lead to payoff v0 in the winning case). If the player defects then the difference of utility
is −v0p(i)inv(ti, 0) + (1− p(i)inv(ti, 0))(v1 − v0). So the strategy is a Nash-equilibrium when (1− p(i)inv(ti, 0))v1 ≤ v0, i.e
v0/v1 ≥ 1− p(i)inv(ti, 0). This inequality has to hold for all types and all players.
For NC00(C5), p
(i)
inv(0, 0) = 1/2 and therefore the quantum nonlocal strategy is an equilibrium only when
v0/v1 ≥ 1/2.
One important characteristic of an equilibrium is the Social Welfare, which is the average utility of the players.
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As a direct consequence of Theorem 1 the average social welfare of the quantum strategy is independent on
the graph
QSW (NC(G)) =
v0 + v1
2
.
Note that the non collaborative games defined have a special feature that we call guaranteed value: in any run
of the game players following the quantum strategy receive their expected payoff with probability 1.
4 Some versions of NC(C5)
In this section we study the game NC00(C5) and then introduce a number of modifications in order to improve
the quantum advantage (ratio of quantum social welfare to correlated social welfare) and also to symmetrize the
game such that the players get 0 and 1 with same probability or have the same probability of being involved
regardless of whether their type is 0 or 1.
4.1 Study of NC00(C5)
Pure Nash equilibria can be described by local functions: each player having one local type bit and one strategy
bit to produce, can locally act as follows:
• 0→ 0 , 1→ 0 constant function 0 denoted 0
• 0→ 1 , 1→ 1 constant function 1 denoted 1
• 0→ 0 , 1→ 1 Identity function denoted 2
• 0→ 1 , 1→ 0 NOT function denoted 3
The set of pure Nash equilibria depends on the ratio v0/v1. The are 20/25/40 pure Nash equilibria (4/4/6 up
to symmetry) when v0/v1 lies within the interval [0, 1/3], [1/3, 1/2] or [1/2, 1] respectively (see Table 2).
Local functions Players utility [×6] SW [×30]
v0/v1 ≤ 1/3
2 1 1 1 1 2v0 + v1 3v1 3v1 3v1 3v1 2v0 + 13v1
3 3 1 1 1 2v0 + v1 2v0 + v1 3v1 3v1 3v1 v0 + 11v1
3 1 3 1 1 2v0 + v1 3v1 2v0 + v1 3v1 3v1 4v0 + 11v1
3 3 3 3 1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 8v0 + 17v1
1/3 ≤ v0/v1 ≤ 1/2
1 3 1 1 0 5v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 5v1 5v0 7v0 + 18v1
2 2 1 1 1 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 5v1 5v1 6v0 + 19v1
3 3 1 1 1 2v0 + v1 2v0 + v1 3v1 3v1 3v1 4v0 + 11v1
3 3 3 3 1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 8v0 + 17v1
v0/v1 ≥ 1/2
3 2 1 1 0 2v0 + 3v1 4v0 + v1 5v1 5v1 5v0 11v0 + 14v1
1 3 1 1 0 5v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 5v1 5v0 7v0 + 18v1
2 2 1 1 1 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 5v1 5v1 6v0 + 19v1
3 3 1 2 1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 4v0 + v1 5v1 8v0 + 17v1
3 3 3 3 1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 8v0 + 17v1
3 2 3 2 2 2v0 + 3v1 4v0 + v1 2v0 + 3v1 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 14v0 + 11v1
Table 2: Nash equilibria for three intervals of the value v0/v1. Note that the
critical values 1/2 and 1/3 have union of both tables as equilibria.
We can see that most of these equilibria (all of them when v0/v1 ≥ 1/2) correspond to local functions winning
for the 5 types.
When v0 = 2/3 and v1 = 1 then the quantum social welfare of the pseudotelepathy strategy is QSW = 0.83
whereas the best classical social welfare CSW = 0.77.
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As noted in section 3.1 the probability of being involved in NC00 is (p(1, s) = 1 and p(0, s) = 1/2 and the
quantum pseudotelepathy measurements strategy is an equilibrium if v0/v1 ≥ 1/2.
Simililar behavior can be seen with Pareto equilibria (ones in which local utility cannot improve without
reducing the outcome of someone else): see Appendix.
Recall that the characteristic feature of NC00(C5) is that each player has unequal probabilities of getting
different types. The game can be symmetrized by changing the types of the non-involved players from 00 to 01,
as shown in the next section.
4.2 Comments on NC01(C5)
We define a second variant from MCG(C5) : NC01(C5) where any player gets the types 0 and 1 with probability
1/2 by adding an extra 1 for a non-involved player in the types so that Ti = 0i−11i0i+11i+20i+3: see Table 3.
If the type probability distribution is w(t) = 1/6 for all the types, then one can see that any player is involved
with probability 2/3 whether their input is 0 or 1, i.e. p
(i)
inv(0, 0) = p
(i)
inv(1, 0) = 2/3. Hence, by Theorem 2, the
quantum strategy of MCG produces a Nash equilibrium iff v0/v1 ≥ 1/3. Thus, one of the benefits of this variant
is that quantum Nash equilibria exist at a lower ratio v0/v1.
Note that in this version each player is getting a perfect random bit as advice : p(a = 1) = p(a = 0) = 1/2.
When v0 = 2/3 and v1 = 1 then the quantum social welfare of the pseudotelepathy strategy is QSW = 0.83
whereas the best classical social welfare is CSW = 0.78.
Type Involved set Binary answer
Ta = 11111 I(Ta) = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} b(Ta) = 1
T0 = 10100 I(T0) = {0, 1, 4} b(T0) = 0
T1 = 01010 I(T1) = {0, 1, 2} b(T1) = 0
T2 = 00101 I(T2) = {1, 2, 3} b(T2) = 0
T3 = 10010 I(T3) = {2, 3, 4} b(T3) = 0
T4 = 01001 I(T4) = {3, 4, 0} b(T4) = 0
Table 3: NC01(G) game (Here the players are identified with the integers mod-
ulo 5).
4.3 Comments on NC00,0(C5)
A modification of a different kind consists in adding more questions from the stabiliser. As the first example of
this kind we define a game NC00,0(C5), where the additional family of questions has four involved players with
the non-involved player getting type 0, as specified by Table 4.
Type Involved set Binary answer
Ta = 11111 I(Ta) = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} b(T0) = 1
Ti1 = 0i1−20i1−11i10i1+10i1+2 I(Ti1) = {i1 − 1, i1, i1 + 1} b(Ti1) = 0
i1 ∈ {0, . . . , 4}
Ti2 = 0i2−11i20i2+11i2+20i2+3 I(Ti2) = {i2 − 1, i2, i2 + 2, i2 + 3} b(Ti2) = 0
i2 ∈ {0, . . . , 4}
Table 4: NC00,0(G) game.
For v1 = 1, v0 =
2
3
, and the probability distribution w(Ta) =
3
13
, w(Ti1) = w(Ti2) =
1
13
we get a CSW of 0.72
versus a QSW of 0.83
Note that each player gets types 0 and 1 with different probabilities. In fact, it is simple to show that no
choice of w1, w2 and w3 can make these probabilities equal. However, it is possible to modify the set of types so
that equality becomes possible, as shown in the following.
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4.4 Comments on NC00,01,0(C5)
We increase the set of types using other questions from the stabiliser: We define a game NC00,01,0(C5) for which
with a suitable choice of probability distribution the players get 0 and 1 with the same probability.
Type Involved set Binary answer
Ta = 11111 I(Ta) = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} b(T0) = 1
Ti1 = 0i1−20i1−11i10i1+10i1+2 I(Ti1) = {i1 − 1, i1, i1 + 1} b(Ti1) = 0
i1 ∈ {0, . . . , 4}
Ti2 = 0i2−11i20i2+11i2+20i2+3 I(Ti2) = {i2 − 1, i2, i2 + 1} b(Ti2) = 0
i2 ∈ {0, . . . , 4}
Ti3 = 0i3−11i30i3+11i3+20i3+3 I(Ti3) = {i2 − 1, i2, i2 + 2, i2 + 3} b(Ti3) = 0
i3 ∈ {0, . . . , 4}
Table 5: NC00,01,0(G) game.
We consider this game with type probability distributions given by w(Ta) = 3/13, w(ti1) = 1/26, w(Ti2) = 1/26
and w(Ti3) = 1/13.
The involvement probabilities satisfy Pinv(1) > Pinv(0) = 8/13 and the best classical Social wellfare with
v0 = 2/3, v1 = 1 is CSW = 0.72 versus a QSW of 0.83
Note that even though the types Ti2 and Ti3 are similar, the involved sets and thus the utilities are different.
However, if one wants to restrict to scenarios in which the utility can be deterministically determined from the
type, one can just add an extra player with a type allowing to distinguish the different cases and with utility the
average utility of the other players independently of his/her action.
5 Quantum vs correlation separation
In [2] it is asked as an open question whether the separation between classical and quantum social welfare is
bounded. We show in this section how two families of amplification techniques can increase the separation by
adding a penalty for wrong answers and then by increasing the number of players.
5.1 Wrong answer penalty
A possible technique is to penalize bad answers more, using the fact that classical functions always produce a
bad answer for some question. Instead of getting 0 when losing we generalize so that each player gets −Ngv1 if
they answer 1 and −Ngv0 if they answer 0, where Ng can be seen as the penalty for giving a wrong answer. If
δ(s,t),L = 1 if (s, t) ∈ L and 0 otherwise, and Ng is a positive number, then
uj(s|t) = (−Ng)δ(s,t),Lvsj
For NC01(C5) as soon as Ng > 3v1 there exists only two classical Nash equilibria:
• All 0 with a social welfare of −Ngv0+5v0
6
and
• All NOT with a social welfare of −Ngv0+2v0+3v1
6
.
Therefore the classical social welfare decreases linearly with the penalty while the quantum average social
welfare remains v1+v0
2
.
5.2 Distributed parallel repetition
The distributed parallel composition of nonlocal games appears in [11] for the study of non signaling correlations
and also in [7] where it is called k-fold repetition. k groups of players play at the same time and they win
collectively if all the groups win their game.
Theorem 3. There exists games with bounded personal utilities v0, v1 on O(log(
1

)) players ensuring CSW (G)
QSW (G
≤ 
for the ratio best classical social welfare over quantum social welfare with guaranteed value.
7
Proof. It is easy to bound the utility in these settings as for any strategy in a repeated game. If a player p is
involved in the strategy Sj but is not involved in the strategy Si of another group then his utility is conditioned
by the fact that the Si strategy wins to receive a positive utility and
up(Si × Sj) ≤ pwin(Si)up(Sj)
As the quantum strategy obtained from following the nonlocal advice always wins, the QSW remains unchanged
whereas the CSW decreases. For instance CSW (k−fold NC00(C5)) = 56
k
CSW (NC00(C5)).
Therefore using these games one can build games with bounded personal utilities v0, v1 on O(log(
1

)) players
ensuring CSW (G)
QSW (G
≤ 
6 Conclusion
We have used properties of multipartite graph games to define conflict of interest games, and shown that by
combining such games the ratio classical social welfare / quantum social welfare can go to zero.
One can easily extend to stabilizer games [7] to have any number of types and possible strategies.
As pointed out by [2], quantum advice equilibria can be reached without needing a trusted mediator, further-
more they ensure privacy as they are belief invariant. Some other features may be emphasized if we define Nash
equilibria using pseudotelepathy games: such situations ensure a guaranteed utility and they are also better when
analysing the maximal minimal utility. It may be interesting to investigate further how this guaranteed value
property for some quantum equilibria can be used. On the other hand it would also be interesting to investigate
how relaxing the guaranteed win requirement might allow to increase the QSW even further.
The possibility of potentially unlimited improvement of social welfare while preserving belief invariance is
therefore a strong motivation to consider classical payoff tables that arise for usual situations in which Nash
equilibria occur and play an important role. For example, in routing problems an advice provider could use a
quantum advice system as follows. Send either one rotated quantum bit to each player asking for the advice and
each player measures his qubit to get the answer, or (in a trusted setting) compute the advice to give using a
quantum measurement and send a classical message.
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Appendix
Pareto equilibria for NC00 when v0/v1 ≤ 1/3, Nb solutions : 121, Nb distinct equilibria : 18
Local functions Players utility [×6] SW [×30]
2 1 1 0 0 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 5v1 5v0 5v0 13v0 + 12v1
3 3 2 0 0 v0 + 2v1 v0 + 2v1 v0 + 2v1 3v0 3v0 9v0 + 6v1
3 2 1 1 0 2v0 + 3v1 4v0 + v1 5v1 5v1 5v0 11v0 + 14v1
1 3 1 1 0 5v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 5v1 5v0 7v0 + 18v1
1 3 3 1 0 5v1 v0 + 4v1 v0 + 4v1 5v1 5v0 7v0 + 18v1
2 3 1 2 0 3v0 + 2v1 v0 + 4v1 5v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v0 12v0 + 13v1
3 2 2 3 0 v0 + 4v1 4v0 + v1 4v0 + v1 v0 + 4v1 5v0 15v0 + 10v1
2 1 1 1 1 2v0 + v1 3v1 3v1 3v1 3v1 2v0 + 13v1
2 2 1 1 1 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 5v1 5v1 6v0 + 19v1
3 3 1 1 1 2v0 + v1 2v0 + v1 3v1 3v1 3v1 4v0 + 11v1
3 1 3 1 1 2v0 + v1 3v1 2v0 + v1 3v1 3v1 4v0 + 11v1
3 3 1 2 1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 4v0 + v1 5v1 8v0 + 17v1
3 3 2 2 1 2v0 + 3v1 v0 + 4v1 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 9v0 + 16v1
3 2 3 2 1 v0 + 2v1 2v0 + v1 2v0 + v1 2v0 + v1 3v1 7v0 + 8v1
3 2 2 3 1 v0 + 2v1 v0 + 2v1 v0 + 2v1 v0 + 2v1 3v1 4v0 + 11v1
3 3 3 3 1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 8v0 + 17v1
3 2 3 2 2 2v0 + 3v1 4v0 + v1 2v0 + 3v1 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 14v0 + 11v1
3 3 3 3 3 v0 + 4v1 v0 + 4v1 v0 + 4v1 v0 + 4v1 v0 + 4v1 5v0 + 20v1
Pareto equilibria for NC00 when 1/3 ≤ v0/v1 ≤ 1/2 Nb solutions : 91, Nb distinct equilibria : 14
Local functions Players utility [×6] SW [×30]
2 1 1 0 0 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 5v1 5v0 5v0 13v0 + 12v1
3 2 1 1 0 2v0 + 3v1 4v0 + v1 5v1 5v1 5v0 11v0 + 14v1
1 3 1 1 0 5v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 5v1 5v0 7v0 + 18v1
1 3 3 1 0 5v1 v0 + 4v1 v0 + 4v1 5v1 5v0 7v0 + 18v1
2 3 1 2 0 3v0 + 2v1 v0 + 4v1 5v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v0 12v0 + 13v1
3 2 2 3 0 v0 + 4v1 4v0 + v1 4v0 + v1 v0 + 4v1 5v0 15v0 + 10v1
2 2 1 1 1 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 5v1 5v1 6v0 + 19v1
3 3 1 1 1 2v0 + v1 2v0 + v1 3v1 3v1 3v1 4v0 + 11v1
3 3 1 2 1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 4v0 + v1 5v1 8v0 + 17v1
3 3 2 2 1 2v0 + 3v1 v0 + 4v1 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 9v0 + 16v1
3 2 2 3 1 v0 + 2v1 v0 + 2v1 v0 + 2v1 v0 + 2v1 3v1 4v0 + 11v1
3 3 3 3 1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 8v0 + 17v1
3 2 3 2 2 2v0 + 3v1 4v0 + v1 2v0 + 3v1 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 14v0 + 11v1
3 3 3 3 3 v0 + 4v1 v0 + 4v1 v0 + 4v1 v0 + 4v1 v0 + 4v1 5v0 + 20v1
Pareto equilibria when ≥ 1/2, NB solutions 81, Nb distinct equilibria : 12
Local functions Players utility [×6] SW [×30]
2 1 1 0 0 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 5v1 5v0 5v0 13v0 + 12v1
3 2 1 1 0 2v0 + 3v1 4v0 + v1 5v1 5v1 5v0 11v0 + 14v1
1 3 1 1 0 5v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 5v1 5v0 7v0 + 18v1
1 3 3 1 0 5v1 v0 + 4v1 v0 + 4v1 5v1 5v0 7v0 + 18v1
2 3 1 2 0 3v0 + 2v1 v0 + 4v1 5v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v0 12v0 + 13v1
3 2 2 3 0 v0 + 4v1 4v0 + v1 4v0 + v1 v0 + 4v1 5v0 15v0 + 10v1
2 2 1 1 1 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 5v1 5v1 6v0 + 19v1
3 3 1 2 1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 4v0 + v1 5v1 8v0 + 17v1
3 3 2 2 1 2v0 + 3v1 v0 + 4v1 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 9v0 + 16v1
3 3 3 3 1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 8v0 + 17v1
3 2 3 2 2 2v0 + 3v1 4v0 + v1 2v0 + 3v1 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 14v0 + 11v1
3 3 3 3 3 v0 + 4v1 v0 + 4v1 v0 + 4v1 v0 + 4v1 v0 + 4v1 5v0 + 20v1
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Nash equilibria for NC01
Nash equilibria for NC01 when 1/3 ≤ v0/v1 ≤ 1/2, Nb solutions : 76, Nb distinct equilibria : 13
Local functions Players utility [×6] SW [×30]
1 1 2 0 0 5v1 5v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v0 5v0 12v0 + 13v1
3 2 1 1 0 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 5v1 5v0 11v0 + 14v1
1 3 1 1 0 5v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 5v1 5v0 8v0 + 17v1
3 2 2 1 0 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 5v0 11v0 + 14v1
1 3 3 1 0 5v1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 5v0 9v0 + 16v1
1 3 1 2 0 5v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v0 9v0 + 16v1
2 1 3 2 0 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v0 11v0 + 14v1
2 2 1 1 1 3v0 + 2v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 5v1 5v1 5v0 + 20v1
3 3 1 2 1 2v0 + 3v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 8v0 + 17v1
3 3 2 2 1 3v0 + 2v1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 10v0 + 15v1
3 3 3 3 1 3v0 + 2v1 2v0 + 3v1 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 11v0 + 14v1
3 2 3 2 2 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 2v0 + 3v1 14v0 + 11v1
3 3 3 3 3 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 2v0 + 3v1 10v0 + 15v1
Nash equilibria for NC01 when v0/v1 ≥ 1/2, Nb solutions 40, Nb distinct equilibirums :6
Local functions Players utility [×6] SW [×30]
3 2 1 1 0 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 5v1 5v0 11v0 + 14v1
1 3 1 1 0 5v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 5v1 5v0 8v0 + 17v1
2 2 1 1 1 3v0 + 2v1 2v0 + 3v1 5v1 5v1 5v1 5v0 + 20v1
3 3 1 2 1 2v0 + 3v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 8v0 + 17v1
3 3 3 3 1 3v0 + 2v1 2v0 + 3v1 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 5v1 11v0 + 14v1
3 2 3 2 2 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 3v0 + 2v1 2v0 + 3v1 14v0 + 11v1
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